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**CROATIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY:
CHALLENGES, PREVENTION AND RESPONSE SYSTEM**

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**CROATIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY:
CHALLENGES, PREVENTION AND RESPONSE SYSTEM**

Anita Perešin¹

ABSTRACT

The Republic of Croatia is a transitional as well as a post-conflict country, building its international and security strategy on the principals of cooperative security and partnership in international relations. After the September 11, 2001, Croatia has accepted the goals of antiterrorist coalition and the global anti-terrorism engagement. Considering its geographical position in the region that is still not entirely stable, and the estimates of the terrorism threat, Croatia has developed its own strategy to combat terrorism. The main characteristics of the global efforts, as well as the NATO and EU models are comprised in the Croatian strategy, which was used as an important pointer in the formation of the counter-terrorism system. Such efforts stipulated modifications in the security sector and its adaptation to the new requirements. The set goals were not entirely met in the planned time frame, meaning that the strengthening of the system in Croatia is ongoing. In the paper, the focus will be towards the strategy analysis, mapping of the key institutions and their obligations, and the definitions of the reasons of the slower realization of the set strategic goals in the fight against terrorism.

Keywords: Croatian counter-terrorism strategy, Croatian security sector reform, stakeholder security

1 INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Croatia is a transitional as well as post-conflict country located in a geopolitically unstable region. After it gained its independence and ended the Homeland War, it continues with the processes of democratization and stabilization of the system in which transitional processes were halted by the aggression and during the war lasting from 1991 to 1995. During the Homeland War, terrorism was defined exclusively as part of a criminal code, and many acts that were part of the aggression on the Republic of Croatia were introduced as terrorist acts. The Criminal Code of 1993

¹ The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the institution in which she is employed.

(Official Gazette No. 32/93) stipulates acts committed with the aim of the destruction of state constitution and jeopardizing the safety of the citizens as criminal acts. In this period, little attention was given to the discussion at which level such an approach is acceptable and at what level the instruments necessary for the fight against terrorism are built.

A similar practice was continued after the Homeland War had ended, even though one car-bomb attack occurred in front of the police station in Rijeka in 2005, which represents a typical act of terrorism. That attack was perpetrated as a revenge of the terrorist organization Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya after the Croatian police had, on the request of the United States, captured and extradited one of their leaders. However, even this event did not change the Croatian approach to the perception of the threat of terrorism. The Criminal code continued to be the only document where terrorism was mentioned and defined. The situation has not changed even after the 9/11 attacks. Some changes become apparent as a result of the pressures that come from the Croatian obligation during the process of strengthening the partnership with NATO. Those obligations were, firstly, the formation of the strategic national security policy documents and secondly, the necessary changes in the security sector with the aim of increasing its transparency and effectiveness.

Two reasons for such situation can be highlighted: first, the development of the democratic political system concentrated more on the other transitional challenges, while the security sector and the national security system were in the second place; second, the Republic of Croatia did not, in its assessments, consider the terrorism as a special threat to national security, and accordingly did not try to form the policy and the system for the fight against such threats.

In 2002, Croatian Parliament adopted the first National Security Strategy (Official Gazette No. 33/02) which defines terrorism not only as an internal, but also as an international threat. The National strategy specially highlights the threat that comes from international terrorism, which was in the meantime defined in the Criminal Code of 1997 (Official Gazette No. 110/97).² Except for defining terrorism and its positioning in the group of threats for the Republic of Croatia, some serious steps were made in the same year in the process of the security sector reform, which follows the adoption of the new law regulating that area.³

² The mentioned Criminal Code recognizes criminal acts of terrorism against state and international terrorism. Since the definition of the terrorism against the State is almost identical to the one from the Criminal Code of 1993, the international terrorism is defined as follows: „Persons purposely afflicting harm against foreign countries or international organizations, causes explosions or fire, or through any dangerous act or means causes danger to persons and/or property, or perpetrates kidnapping of a person or commits any other violence, will be punished by incarceration for the period of less than three years“, Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia, Sept. 29, 1997, Official Gazette No. 110/97.

³ Law on Security Services, 2002, Official Gazette No. 32/02.

In the last ten years, the Republic of Croatia has not made a close analysis of potential terrorist threats, which influenced the pace of the adaptation of the security sector to the fight against terrorism. Stimulation of the changes of the strategic documents and the organization of the system came primarily from the obligations the Republic of Croatia took on within the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) framework.

Thus, for the purpose of this paper, the research will be based on the hypothesis that terrorism in the Republic of Croatia was treated as a negligible threat, causing a slow adjustment of strategic documents and the security system to the fight against terrorism. To confirm this hypothesis, the paper will analyze the Croatian approach to terrorism in the last three decades through strategic documents and legislation, and show the organization of the system for the fight against terrorism. The lack of focus on terrorism as the threat to the Republic of Croatia resulted in building of the model in which the State is primarily responsible for the fight against terrorism and assumes all responsibility for it. On the other hand, counter-terrorism models or early warning systems of most western countries include participation of the citizens. Thus, the paper will focus on the identification of the instruments for the inclusion of citizens in the counter-terrorism concept in the Republic of Croatia.

2 STATE AND POPULATION ROLE IN FORMING THE COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

Lee Jarvis i **Michael Lister** (2010: 173-188) propose that new threats could be successfully overcome if there is a participation of the population in the execution of the security policy. Any person participating in it is called a stakeholder of security. It is also stressed that participation through state instruments alone is not enough. This is especially true for the strategies of counter-terrorism fight, pointing out that it is a contemporary threat, employing different methods than the Cold War adversaries. Such a threat is unforeseeable, with varying forms and instruments, challenging the efforts towards effective protection, thus posing a serious challenge to modern societies.

Jarvis and Lister (2010) propose the impossibility of achieving the premise of fight against terrorism without the internal participation of the population. Modern terrorism holds the markings of unprecedented insecurity, using that very premise as a basis of contemporary strategies. Many authors underline how the 9/11 terrorist attacks have led to the radical transformation of our perception of security, as well as the need for a transformation of the instruments used in the fight against terrorism (more on the topic, see: Jackson, 2005 and Jarvis, 2009). The very fact of the inability to foresee the danger which may cause considerable insecurity aided in the radicalization of the security policies and instruments in the fight against terrorism. Also, the State has endeavored to explain its approach by stressing the danger, thereby maximizing the support for its policies from the population.

The instruments of the fight against terrorism were no longer constructed only in the area of national security, but have started forming in other areas of the system, such as immigration policy, population mobility and so on. The need for a wide framework of measures and instruments in the fight against terrorism has led to undesirable consequences, especially in the area of the violation of human rights and freedoms. Therefore, the anti-terrorism approach putting the action of the State alone to the forefront might have limiting effects, since the State is in no position to follow all the aspects of social dynamics in contemporary conditions. The demands for the centralization of the key instruments have led to the strengthening of the capacity of the State, though not to more favorable results. The participation of the population thus seemed the only way to strengthen the combined capability of the State and the society in the fight against terrorism.

Jarvis and Lister (2010) propose the need to intensify the responsabilisation of the population, with the strategies of the fight against terrorism making up a frame for the determining the participation of the population, as well as of the way of their participation. The mentioned authors also suggest that along with the analysis of the strategies of the fight against terrorism, the identification should be made of the content of the participation of the population, as well as of the instruments of achieving such participation. Therefore, the analysis of the development of the Croatian counter-terrorism system shall include the observation of the aforementioned factors.

3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CROATIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM SYSTEM

The development of the Croatian counter-terrorism system is divided into three phases, each of which is marked with the features of the then security situation in the Republic of Croatia and then active strategic political goals. First phase covers the period from the gaining of independence till the end of the Homeland War, and characterizes the acting of the system in war conditions. The second phase covers the period from the end of the war till the accession to the Membership Action Plan (MAP), in which the whole system was focused on demobilization and adjustment for the acting in peace conditions. The third phase covers bigger organizational reforms which were part of the preparation process for the accession to NATO, and is characterized with the implementation of security standards according to NATO requirements and recommendations.

3.1 First phase: The system development from the independence to the end of the Homeland War (1991 – 1995)

Since gaining its independence in 1991, the Republic of Croatia has been developing its defense, security and intelligence systems in parallel. In the beginning, those systems were primarily oriented on the defending of the sovereignty of the State, establishing of the jurisdiction on the territory of the entire country and on the establishing of stability and safety of all citizens in the newly created State. The period from 1991 to 1995, i.e. to the end of the Homeland War, should be seen in the light of war

activities, where the focus of all state elements was on ending the war and defending the national territory. The Croatian counter-terrorism system of that period was primarily interested in the fight against internal terrorism, as described in Article 1 of the first Law on Internal Affairs from 1991 (Official Gazette No. 19/91), on the protection against terrorist and other violent acts or armed rebellion.

The umbrella body responsible for the coordination of all parts of the counter-terrorism system is the Office for the protection of the Constitutional Order (UNS), established in May 1991. The scope and main responsibilities of the UNS were advisory and expert support to the bodies that share responsibility for the protection of the constitutional order within the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The UNS was part of the system for the protection of the Croatian constitutional order, responsible for the convergence and coordination of the activities of the whole system; strategic research and analyses; security evaluations in the interests of the State and for its safety; experts' oversight of the work of the intelligence agencies and the cooperation with other institutions of the security interest for the Republic of Croatia.

Alongside the UNS, the MoI, MoD and intelligence services also played a specific role and had authority in countering terrorism. The most prolific activities in this period were the activities of the intelligence services which were divided into civilian and military ones. Based on such division, the services were under the auspices of respective ministries of the interior and the defense. Protection of the constitutional order and counter-intelligence protection were the responsibility of the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (SZUP), which was an organizational unit within the MoI. Its main responsibilities were the suppression of actions or of the intent of violence in jeopardizing and the destruction of state order, terrorism and organized crime. Counter-intelligence service was obviously a part of the repressive system. Its employees had the authority of the police. The service was under the jurisdiction of the deputy minister of the interior.

3.2 Second phase: From the end of the Homeland War to the accession to MAP (1996 – 2002)

In the period after the end of the Homeland War, the responsible counter-terrorism systems (military, civilian, intelligence) were, in an organizational sense and through the implementation of the new national legislation, reconstructed and prepared for acting in peace instead of in war conditions in all scopes of their work. In that time the focus was on demobilization and establishment of the system that will act in peace conditions. However, terrorism as a threat was still assumed through the possibility of violent and subversive activities of still present radical rebellious groups from the territory of Croatia or neighboring countries still involved in war or crisis activities.

It should be mentioned that the first legislation was introduced during the war time and that the structure and defined goals were determined through actions in war and crisis environment and conditions. The end of the war imposed new obligations in terms of adjustments in operating in peacetime and in the already planned convergence to the Euro-Atlantic integrations. This was one of the most important strategic political goals of all the Croatian governments. At the same time, the organization of all these structures was more or less inherited from the time of the former state. Only several new services were established, mostly in intelligence sector. Their absence or unclearly defined goals and objects caused the situation where their responsibilities were unclear, which often caused rivalry that was negatively reflected in the coordination of work and mutual cooperation. Still, there were neither systematically arranged oversight mechanisms, i.e. democratic oversight already introduced in the present developed democratic countries, nor coordinated activities of security sector in counter-terrorism activities. The legal framework for defining the terrorist threats was narrow and mostly seen from the point of view of criminal justice. This phase characterizes the lack of strategic documents and strategies for defining national security policy and the unclear responsibilities of each part of the system in case of terrorist attacks.

3.3 Third phase: Security sector reform as part of the accession process for the NATO and EU membership

The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States was a milestone for the work of the intelligence agencies around the world, especially in the United States and for its allies. As one of the answers on the new terrorist threats, considerable security sector reforms and reconstructions have been initiated. At the same time, the reforms of the Croatian intelligence system (organizational changes, now legislation)⁴ are initiated which were not inspired by the need for the change of the counter-terrorism methods in force, as the risk of potential terrorist attack on Croatia was not considered high. Croatian reforms were rather motivated by the preparation for the accession to NATO and EU.

Thus, the year 2002 is considered a milestone that marks the beginning of the third phase of the Croatian security system reform, when Croatia joined MAP. It was the first step in the preparation process for NATO membership that was finished in 2009. That process launched a set of reforms in the security sector, which was NATO's main interest. Similarly, reforms were introduced to comply with the EU security requirements.

Organizationally, significant changes were implemented within the intelligence community after the introduction of the new *Law on Security Services*, which defines three agencies - Counterintelligence Agency (POA), Intelligence Agency (OA) and Military Security Agency (VSA). The most important change was a detachment of SZUP from the MoI and its establishment as a separate civilian

⁴ Law on Security Services, 2002, Official Gazette No. 32/02

counterintelligence agency (POA), with no further police authority. In this period, changes were introduced separately and in clear prescription of obligations and responsibilities between civilian (intelligence and counterintelligence) and military intelligence agency, alongside the establishment of an umbrella oversight body (Office of the National Security Council - UVNS). Also, elements of civilian oversight are clearly defined through the scope of parliamentarian *Committee for Internal Politics and National Security* and the *Council for Civilian Oversight of the Work of Security and Intelligence Agencies*. The National Security Strategy is also adopted with defined main points of the Croatian security policy. National legislation stipulates responsibilities of all parts of the system in the counter-terrorism actions, and terrorism was put on the top of the scale of security threats described in annual guidelines for the intelligence. The public perception of the risk of terrorism is still considerably low.

4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The above-mentioned organizational changes are part of the process of national security policy development that follows Croatian strategic political interests. Croatia has defined its strategic interests in the national security area in 2002 in the introduction of the *National Security Strategy*.

During the Croatian presidency over the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council (2008 – 2009) Croatia has introduced another strategic document – *National Strategy for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism* (Official Gazette No. 139/08) with the aim of establishing the systemic prerequisites for the fight against terrorism. This strategy, with the aim of efficient implementation and better coordination assumes the establishment of the Council for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, as well as the introduction of an action plan which, however, has never been implemented in reality. This situation could be seen as a result of perception of terrorism as a negligible threat for the Republic of Croatia, even though this kind of threat is in all Croatian strategic documents mentioned as one of the main global security threats. Currently, the most attention has been given to the international terrorism and its characteristics, and the Croatian position has always been interpreted in the context of possible threats posed by terrorism of this kind. The Croatian media cover in detail all terrorist attacks around the world, and the possibility of such attacks on the Croatian territory has frequently been highlighted. Such concerns rose after Croatia joined NATO due to assessments that NATO membership puts Croatia into the group of countries that could be interesting targets for the terrorists. Nevertheless, a more significant interest in the risk from terrorism has still not arisen neither by the state administration nor by the citizens - certainly not significant enough to initiate new measures, or to develop more instruments for countering terrorism. This has eventually resulted in a very formal national counter-terrorism policy and its poor realization in the sense of the development of new approaches and new instruments.

4.1 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia

According to the Croatian Constitution Act, the Croatian *National Security Strategy*, represents a conceptual document by which the Croatian Parliament, as the highest political and legislative body, establishes and accepts political views on basic national security concerns. The main purpose of such a document is to establish common standards for the creation and implementation of systemic institutional solutions, as well as the measures and activities of reaction to the general security concerns and specific threats to which the Republic of Croatia is exposed.

Apart from a political dialog and military and defense cooperation, the Republic of Croatia recognizes cooperation and harmonization between policy and its implementation of the activities for combat of asymmetric threats – terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration etc. as very important. Since the organizers of such threats use the Croatian territory as a transit route on their way to the EU, special attention is given to the monitoring of the Croatian national borders. This Strategy stresses the intensification of transnational threats in the region and further (such as terrorism, organized crime, refugee crisis etc.) which could indirectly and directly have a negative impact on Croatian national security. Such processes, irrespective of their origin, are determined as a real security risk to which special attention should be given. At the same time, terrorism is observed in the form of global terrorism threatening international peace and security, which affects Croatian interests as well. In general, it is assumed that global security risks put Croatian state authorities and institutions at all levels in danger of being exposed to negative influence and that the final result of such activities could be the criminalization of social relations and intensification of terrorism and organized crime appearances.

In the National Security Strategy, terrorism is recognized as a global threat directly highlighting the importance of the principle of indivisible security. In its Strategy, the Republic of Croatia stresses that without appropriate cooperation of the entire international community, terrorism as a global threat would not be annihilated. Even if not being in direct danger, the Republic of Croatia, as highlighted, fully supports the efforts and goals of the international antiterrorist coalition, lead by the United States, and provide active support to the coalition through its strategic commitment to common values, goals and assets, in accordance with its capacities.

In view of the Croatia's position, the influence of transnational threats (terrorism and other) as well as of transmission of the crisis from unstable regions (Mediterranean/North Africa, Middle East, Caucasus) towards the European continent is also recognized as a security threat. In that sense, the strategy highlights the fact that Croatia is located along the corridor connecting European regions with

new energy resources in Asia. As a possible conflict of interests, potential attempts are recognized with regard to control over transit routes that lead to new resources, or to gaining of influence in the area of resources, which could lead to a wider regional crisis and risks to Croatian security and stability.

The basic security goal of the Republic of Croatia is the development of prerequisites and criteria for a free, lawful and stable political, economical and social development of the Croatian society in cooperation and mutual harmony with other democratic countries, which would be achieved through three special security goals: 1) establishment, development and enforcement of adequate policies, measures, activities and institutions in the security area; 2) development of convenient security environment at the regional and global level through the incorporation in international security integration and cooperation with other states and 3) through the development of a stable and economically advanced society that would be capable of building and maintaining long-term effective security mechanisms and resources and able to effectively react to security challenges, risks and threats.

Through the principles affecting national security, the basic conceptual organizational framework as well as the framework for the work of responsible national security institutions have been established. There are two principles important for understanding of the approach to counter, defined by Croatia: *the principle of active involvement and effective contribution in international efforts for the development of acceptable security environment* (the Republic of Croatia represents the attitude that security is inseparable, which makes the States dependent upon each other and demands mutual cooperation in the approach to the reaction on actual security challenges) and *the principle of healthy and equal partnership* (implying cooperation, trust and equality in the cooperation process with other states with the goal of achieving mutual security goals).

The Strategy concludes that in the fight against security risks like terrorism and organized crime, it is necessary to undertake a number of specific measures for the elimination of the mentioned threats, such as the development of effective border control system, augmentation of the police and intelligence cooperation with neighboring countries in the monitoring and hampering of terrorist groups and organized crime, including the improvement in the exchange of information.

If the content and the instruments for the insuring of the Croatian national security are considered based on Jarvis and Lister's (2010) model, the conclusion could be reached that their advocating the participation of the population is feeble at best, and that all of the pertinent instruments are to be ensured by the State. Although it is admitted in several passages that today we face new types of peril which are difficult to combat by national state instruments alone, the conclusions are drawn that the lack of competence at the national level is compensated by partnerships and memberships in

international organizations. The participation of the population at the national level is not anticipated in the realization of the entirety of the security policy, including the realization of the counter-terrorism instruments.

4.2 National strategy for the prevention and suppression of terrorism

In November 2008, the Croatian Government adopted the *National Strategy for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism* (Official Gazette No. 139/08), after almost two- year adjustment between different state administration sectors, in which the basic framework of the Croatian counter-terrorism activities was laid out. This document also gives directions for improvement of existing and the development of new measures, mechanisms and instruments for the prevention and action. It follows and thematically supplements the *National Security Strategy* and *Strategic Defense Plan*, as well as other national strategic documents linked with the prevention and suppression of terrorism. Additionally, this Strategy supports those goals and values that were highlighted in the Global counter-terrorism strategy of the United Nations and Counter-terrorism strategy of the European Union, as well as other basic counter-terrorist documents within the scope of work of the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE and UN Security Council. This Strategy was adopted during the Croatian presidency over the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and it is not the result of any new approach to Croatian counter-terrorism policy.

The Strategy defines the terrorism as “planned, systemic, intentional use of violence, of threat with violence, against people or/and property, as an instrument for causing and using of threat inside some ethnic or religious community, public, state or the whole international community, with the aim of achieving politically, religiously, ideologically or socially motivated changes”. This definition represents advancement regarding the earlier mentioned definition from the criminal codes which are directed to internal and international terrorism, without clearly defined characteristics that loosely define some violent act as a terrorist act.

The Croatian counter-terrorism approach, as it is viewed in this Strategy, is the reflection of perception that modern terrorism does not recognize state borders, which could characterize it as international. Hence responses to such terrorism should be international and multilateral, as cooperative expression of mutual willingness, basic values and interests of international community. With its actions in the international arena, the Republic of Croatia demonstrates its interest in the strengthen of its national security, by giving the most effective contribution to the security of its partners and allies and the entire international community. Such an attitude is recognized by the Republic of Croatia as its responsibility and obligation.

In the prevention of terrorism, the Republic of Croatia gives special attention to its activities in the South-East Europe with the cooperation with other countries. These activities consist of two components. The first covers the cooperation of security sectors of the countries of the region in terrorism prevention through policy, intelligence and border control cooperation. The second component represents overall Croatian foreign political activities towards the countries of the region, which is directed on the development of political, economical and cultural relations, as forms of achievement of long-term stabilization of the entire region, which is recognized as a right way of preventing terrorism.

When discussing counter-terrorism measures, this Strategy highlights the main role of the civilian sector and economy in the prevention and suppression of terrorism. Croatian attitude is that there is enough space for development of and improvement in public-private and social partnership, as well as relations with non-government organizations, religious communities and the media.

Given conclusions represent a major breakthrough in the way factors to be included in the fight against terrorism are defined in the National Security Strategy of 2002. That signifies the changing of the approach, and the expectation of the participation of the population and businesses in the realization of the strategy of the fight against terrorism. However, the practice lacks implementation of the mechanisms for building such partnerships, and their implementation in practice. Although a significant change has been recognized at the conceptual level, it has not come to life in any of the specific instruments. It could therefore be concluded that such an approach has satisfied the need to include the population in the new concept, but has lacked the real intention to put it into use. Such a development demonstrates poor understanding of the mechanisms of the fight against terrorism and the significant role the population could be given in it.

5 THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESENT CROATIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM SYSTEM


Croatian counter-terrorism system could be divided into parts responsible for the prevention and for the reaction in case of a terrorist attack. Prevention is primarily the responsibility of the intelligence system, while elite special police and military forces as well as protection and rescues services are responsible for the reaction in case of a terrorist attack.

a) Intelligence system

The last intelligence system reform was made in 2006, with the introduction of the Security and Intelligence System Act (Official Gazette No. 79/06 and 105/06). By the merging of the counter-intelligence agency (POA) and intelligence agency (OA) the Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA)

was established. Croatia decided to introduce one-intelligence agency system to achieve better coordination of counter-intelligence and intelligence work and to increase effectiveness of work, including effectiveness of the counter-terrorism activities, with the establishment of a more continuous flow of intelligence information and building analysis capacity in one place.

The SOA is responsible for the collecting and analysis of all information important for the national security. Its work is focused on the prevention of all activities against the constitutional order and on jeopardizing the security of state bodies, citizens and national interests. Military-Security and Intelligence Agency (VSOA) is an organizational unit of the Ministry of Defense, responsible for supporting MoD and the Army in the execution of defense duties, and for collecting and analyzing of information that could jeopardize state defense capabilities. Operational and Technical center for Telecommunication Surveillance (OTC) is responsible for telecommunication surveillance, while Information Systems Security Bureau (ZSIS) represents a national state body responsible for the technical area of information systems security (Croatian NCSA, SAA and NDA authority). The Office of the National security council as an umbrella body within the Croatian security and intelligence system has three main functions: it performs expert and administrative tasks for the *National Security Council* and the *Council for the Coordination of Work of Security and Intelligence Agencies*; it is authorized for conducting the oversight of legality of work of the SOA, VSOA and OTC; and it performs the duties of the Croatian National Security Authority (NSA).



Picture 1: Scheme of the security-intelligence system of the Republic of Croatia

The work of the security and intelligence system is, at the political level, directed from the National Security Council, as the highest political body responsible for national security (members of the National Security Council are President of the Republic, Prime Minister, ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs and justice, national security adviser to the President, chief of General Staff, and the directors of the UVNS, SOA and VSOA). At the operational level, the system is coordinated by the Council for the Coordination of the Work of Security-Intelligence Agencies, which is responsible for operative harmonization of the work of the agencies in implementation of the National Security Council political orders. The members of the Council are: member of the Government responsible for the national security (i.e. is Minister of the Interior), national security adviser to the President and the directors of the UVNS, SOA and VSOA.

With the changes in legislation, a clear framework has been established for the intelligence system, setting obligations and clear responsibilities. Article 23 of the Security and Intelligence System Act clearly stipulates the SOA's obligation to act in prevention of all activities that could be launched to threaten constitutional order, endanger safety of state bodies, citizens and national interests through terrorist acts or other forms of organized violent acts – the primary obligation of the agency. Moreover, new instruments of action of the security-intelligence systems stipulate the introduction of new oversight mechanisms with the aim of decreasing and eliminating possible violations of human rights and freedoms. Expert oversight is the responsibility of the UVNS; parliamentary oversight is under the Committee for Internal Policy and National Security. In addition, a mechanism of civilian oversight through the institution of the Council for Civilian Oversight of the Work of Security and Intelligence Agencies in the Croatian Parliament has also been introduced.

b) Ministry of the Interior

The scope of work of the Ministry of the Interior includes protection of public safety, defined in the *Strategic Plan of the Ministry of the Interior and Other Institutions in Function of the Protection and Rescue for the Period of 2012-2014*. Public security measures stipulated in this strategic plan are all criminal acts, accidents and natural disasters (fires, epidemics, terrorism, war, etc.) which threaten life, personal integrity, property, economy, human rights, public safety and order, and have harmful, tragic or catastrophic consequences. Together with the MoI in such situations, this strategic plan defines obligations and responsibilities of *National Protection and Rescue Directorate (DUZS)*, which is responsible for the development of the protection and rescue system in crisis. *Croatian fire community* is responsible for the creation of voluntary fire protection system (firefighting and rescue in the case of fire or explosions, as well as for the technical support in accidents and hazardous situations), while *Croatian Mine Action Centre* organizes and controls mine actions in Croatia. Responsibilities of those four bodies are the protection and rescue of life, personal integrity and

property, as well as the development of the public safety system and preparedness at the highest possible level. Their plans and preparations include capabilities for the reaction in case of a terrorist attack on the Croatian territory.

Special police force is the organizational unit of the MoI, responsible for executing the actions against all types of terrorism, solving hostage and other crisis situations, hijacking of airplanes and other vehicles, apprehension of the perpetrators of the any criminal act, specially the security of high-ranking officials, etc. Special Police Force Directorate is, organizationally, under the Police Directorate, and Special Police Units are placed in four regional centers in Zagreb, Rijeka, Osijek and Split.

c) Ministry of Defense

Beside the above mentioned responsibilities of Military Security and Intelligence Agency (VSOA), which is an organizational unit of the MoD within the security and intelligence system of the Republic of Croatia, the Special Operations Division also has jurisdiction in the context of the fight against terrorism. The Division was established in 2000 by merging of the Croatian National Guard Company, an elite force of the Croatian Army formed during the Homeland War, and the Center for Special Martial Arts. Today, the Division is one of the most elite units of the Croatian Army and one of the best and highly- trained and equipped special operations units in the region. Among other things, the unit is specialized for infiltration into the enemy's rear area and extraction of the force from the enemy rear by air, water and land, anti-terrorist actions, assistance in possible natural disasters and large-scale catastrophes, participation in international military operations, implementation of special actions in military and non-military operations such as search and rescue, reconnaissance, gathering and processing of intelligence, executing diversions in water, land and air, especially in difficult terrains etc. The unit is equipped with state-of-the-art weapons and specialist equipment.

From the demonstrated system, it can be concluded that instruments and capabilities needed for the fight against terrorism in different parts of the system are being developed, and that they are well trained for all scenarios. However, there is a lack of coordination at the strategic level, and of equalization of the efforts between different sectors. In light of such a lack of strategic coordination, each sector is developing autonomously. The inexistence of a civilian crisis management system is a considerable drawback, and it is unclear what jurisdictions each part of the system would have in crisis situations caused by a terrorist attack. Also, it should be mentioned that organizationally, the Republic of Croatia is slow to adapt to the requirements of the NATO and EU, especially if some standards are not synchronized between the two organizations. This confirms that the realization of the goals set in the strategies of the national security and the fight against terrorism is not at the

desired level, to mention but the area of the organization of the system and the coordination of the actions realizing the strategies concerned.

6 CONCLUSION

During the last three decades the development of the Croatian system for fighting against terrorism has been exposed to many challenges of transitional and post-conflict periods. Strategic political interests of all Croatian governments since the proclamation of Croatian independence to the present day have been directed towards the creation of a modern democratic national security system, primarily through the convergence of the Croatian system with the models and security requirements of NATO and the EU. The process of adjustment itself in organizational sense and on strategic-level policy documents has been carried out in several phases. This paper has analyzed the development phases of the system for the fight against terrorism.

Three phases have identified in which, depending on the political and security situation in the Republic of Croatia, the terrorism is viewed in different light: the phase of action in wartime conditions, when the terrorism was viewed through the prism of violent acts within an armed rebellion, and the entire system was organized for actions in war conditions; the second phase, where the terrorism is still viewed as an internal threat from the ranks of rebel groups left behind, while the system itself is being demilitarized and adapted for peace time conditions; the third phase, which coincides in time with the reforms being put in effect worldwide to better adapt security sectors for the fight against transnational terrorism. Croatia also working on reforms to its system, yet not due to clear and present danger to Croatia, but for the demands of the accession processes to NATO and the EU.

Only in the final phase does Croatia introduce first strategic documents, the National Security Strategy, and some years later the National strategy for the prevention and the suppression of terrorism. Although the above Strategies underline the terrorism as one of the most serious security threats in the modern world, separate measures and instruments for fighting such threats in Croatia were implemented slowly and with significant time delays, while the process of establishing a more effective coordination of the entire system is still active.

The analysis has confirmed the initial hypothesis that by treating terrorism as a negligible threat in Croatia, the consequent adaptation of the strategic documents and the security system itself for the fight against terrorism was delayed. Also, it has been demonstrated that the system continues to be organized in a way in which the State bears the sole responsibility for the fight against terrorism, while the instruments for the inclusion of the population and non-state sector, although recognized in the national strategy, have not been implemented in practice. The organizational and the coordination

models require promotion and the continuous adaptation to NATO and EU standards. Adaptation of the national security policy at the strategic level to the trends of contemporary terrorism is equally important. This pertains to the National Security Strategy, demanding a prompt revision, not only from the aspect of observing terrorism but also from the aspect of other asymmetrical and actual security threats.

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